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Letter dated 14 July 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 13 July 2016, addressed to you from Mehmet Dânâ, representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (see annex).

I would be grateful if the text of the present letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 44, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Y. Halit Çevik
Permanent Representative

16-12447 (E) 220716

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Annex to the letter dated 14 July 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I am writing in response to the letter dated 20 June 2016 addressed to you by the Greek Cypriot representative in New York and circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council (A/70/959-S/2016/554), which contains yet again false assertions similar to those made in his previous letters. In order to set the record straight, I would like to bring the following to your attention.

At the outset, regarding the claims of so-called "infringements of international air traffic regulations" and "violations of the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey", I wish, once again, to reiterate that flights within the sovereign airspace of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus take place with the full knowledge and consent of the relevant authorities of the State, over which the Greek Cypriot administration in South Cyprus has no jurisdiction or right of say whatsoever. The civil aviation authority of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is the sole competent authority to provide air traffic and aeronautical information services within its own national airspace. As for the false assertions that Turkey "illegally issued several notices to airmen", it must be underlined that activities within the Ercan advisory airspace that require notices to airmen are carried out by or coordinated with the relevant authorities of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in accordance with article 3 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention).

Similarly, the claim in the letter regarding the Turkish Cypriot ports is also baseless, given the fact that the Greek Cypriot administration has no jurisdiction or right of say over Northern Cyprus. Furthermore, this claim ignores the present realities on the ground, namely, the existence of two independent self-governing States on the island of Cyprus, each exercising sovereignty and jurisdiction within its respective territory.

As to the repeated false allegations regarding Ercan airport in the North, it should once again be underlined that the technologically up-to-date Ercan area control centre and airport in North Cyprus have been providing regular, reliable and safe air traffic services since the Greek Cypriot refusal in 1977 to provide air traffic services in the northern part of the island, in line with its isolation policy that has been imposed on the Turkish Cypriot people. Ever since, all flights within the sovereign airspace of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus have taken place with the full knowledge and permission of the Civil Aviation Department of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, over which the Greek Cypriot administration in South Cyprus has no jurisdiction or control.

Moreover, the isolation imposed on the Turkish Cypriots, which the Greek Cypriot side attempts to perpetuate by encouraging the international community to deem all air and sea ports in Northern Cyprus as "illegal", is in complete contravention of international law, as well as the call made by the then-Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, in his report to the Security Council dated 28 May 2004 (S/2004/437), in which he clearly states "I would hope they [members of the Security Council] can give a strong lead to all States to cooperate both bilaterally and in international bodies to eliminate unnecessary restrictions and barriers that

have the effect of isolating the Turkish Cypriots and impeding their development, deeming such a move as consistent with Security Council resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984)".

The legislation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on aeronautical safety meets all standards and recommendations of the International Civil Aviation Organization, providing safe and swift navigation of aircraft landing at or taking off from Ercan airport and using the airspace of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. All airports in Northern Cyprus are in full conformity with international standards, and necessary investments have been made to keep up with developing technology. The number of air traffic controllers has been increased in accordance with the increasing number of flights over the years, and the Ercan area control centre is in regular and close cooperation with the Ankara area control centre in order to ensure the safe conduct of all flights in the region. In 2015 alone, the number of passengers that used Ercan airport stood at nearly 3.5 million (compared with 3.25 million in 2014), while a 7 per cent increase in that number is expected in 2016. Moreover, in 2015, nearly 26,000 planes used Ercan airport for arrival and departure, and around 210,000 planes used the Ercan advisory airspace, a total which is expected to increase by 7 per cent in 2016. In that respect, it must be stressed that the Turkish Cypriot side is committed to upholding the highest standards in the field of air navigation safety, in full conformity with the Chicago Convention of 1944, and that it is ready to cooperate with the Greek Cypriot authorities on this very important issue.

At a time when the comprehensive settlement negotiations are progressing swiftly in a result-oriented atmosphere, I deem it necessary to stress the need to fully channel all our efforts towards achieving a just and lasting settlement of the Cyprus conflict in line with the established United Nations parameters and the joint declaration of 11 February 2014, which envisage a new partnership on the basis of the political equality of the two peoples of the island within the framework of a bizonal, bicommunal federation with two constituent States of equal status. Moreover, the Greek Cypriot administration should once again be reminded that its counterpart is, and has always been, the Turkish Cypriot side, not Turkey.

Availing myself of the present opportunity, I would like to call upon the Greek Cypriot side to discontinue such counterproductive and outdated rhetoric, which is not reflective of the joint vision and cooperation expressed by the leaders of both communities on the island since the resumption of the settlement talks in May 2015. As the two future partners on the island of Cyprus, we should never lose sight of the fact that the solution of the Cyprus problem will comprehensively deal with all pending issues between the two sides and thus focus all our efforts towards the ultimate goal of settlement.

Finally, I would like to reiterate that, as the Turkish Cypriot side, we are committed to maintaining our constructive and positive stance within the context of your good offices mission in Cyprus and encourage our Greek Cypriot neighbours to follow a similar path.

(*Signed*) Mehmet **Dânâ**
Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

United Nations S/2016/624

Security Council

Distr.: General
15 July 2016

Original: English

Identical letters dated 15 July 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I am writing to you with regard to the letters dated 30 March, 10 May and 23 May 2016, sent by the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council.

As with previous such submissions, these letters contain intentionally misleading accusations against Israel with regard to violations of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006). As with previous accusations alleged by the Permanent Representative of Lebanon, the factual record in many of the cited instances has been distorted, while other incidents, as described, do not constitute violations of resolution 1701 (2006).

I would also like to specifically clarify that, since the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNFIL) does not include the delineation of the maritime boundary, all claims of violations of so-called maritime boundaries are beyond the scope of the UNIFIL mandate.

The distortions propounded by the government of Lebanon in this regard are not limited to written communications. In a recent statement to the Security Council, Lebanon cited a preposterous number of alleged violations of resolution 1701 (2006) by Israel. This was unsurprising, given their ongoing practice of distorting facts and attempting to portray events as violative of resolution 1701 (2006) when they clearly do not qualify as such.

Please see Israel's detailed response to the claims alleged by Lebanon (see annexes I-III).

As outlined in previous letters that I have sent and in my recent speech in the Security Council open debate on the Middle East, Lebanese violations of resolution 1701 (2006) are daily occurrences, and Hezbollah's armed presence in southern Lebanon goes unchallenged by the Lebanese government. Despite their visibility and frequency, the vast majority of violations are consistently excluded from the Secretariat's reports.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annexes distributed as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Danny **Danon**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annexes to the identical letters dated 15 July 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Annex I: Israel's response to the alleged accusations: February 2016

Date	*Time*	*Alleged nature of incident*	*Response*
3 February	1000-1025	In the Mount Dov area, an Israel Defense Forces force fired light and medium automatic weapons in the area around the Summaqah post.	This incident does not qualify as a violation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) or the Blue Line.
6 February	0940	An Israel Defense Forces patrol comprising two Hummer vehicles inspected the technical fence from inside Israeli territory opposite Kafr Killa. One Israel Defense Forces soldier aimed the weapon mounted on the vehicle in the direction of Lebanese territory. The patrol left at 1050 hours.	This incident does not qualify as a violation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) or the Blue Line. Israel Defense Forces soldiers position their weapons in the direction from which they identify a threat; the soldiers did not actively point their weapons with the intention to shoot.
10 February	1140	In the Mount Dov area, between the Ramta and Summaqah posts, an Israel Defense Forces force set off two explosive devices. Their explosions were heard on the Lebanese side.	This incident does not qualify as a violation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) or the Blue Line.
	1250	On the outskirts of the town of Kafr Shuba at Bastrah, near position 34-4 of the Indian contingent of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), while herder Wisam Abdul'al was herding livestock an Israel Defense Forces patrol violated the line of withdrawal, proceeding some 181 metres into Lebanese territory, and led some 225 goats into Israeli territory. On 11 February 2016 at 0030 hours, an Israel Defense Forces force returned 134 goats at point B-57 (Aytarun), keeping 91 goats.	The Israel Defense Forces patrol did not cross the Blue Line, and therefore there was no violation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) or the Blue Line. Furthermore, in this particular case, the shepherd and his flock crossed into Israeli territory, thus violating Security Council resolution 1701 (2006), the Blue Line and Israel's sovereignty. On account of this, an Israel Defense Forces force had to act south of the Blue Line to apprehend the goats and returned them at a later time. As has been stressed before, the Israel Defense Forces will not accept Lebanese crossings of the Blue Line. The Israel Defense Forces expects that UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces will exert all efforts to prevent such crossings. Despite many warnings by the Israel Defense Forces and calls to UNIFIL to stop the violations of Israel's sovereignty, the

Date	*Time*	*Alleged nature of incident*	*Response*
			Lebanese continue to cross the Blue Line on a regular basis, thus causing friction, with potential for escalation.
11 February	2130-2145	An Israel Defense Forces patrol fired two flares towards the Mount Dov area.	This incident does not qualify as a violation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) or the Blue Line.
12 February	0915	At Zabdin Farm, inside the Mount Dov area, an Israeli Merkava tank appeared. Its crew released camouflage smoke around the area.	This incident does not qualify as a violation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) or the Blue Line.
	1330	On the outskirts of the town of Wazzani, opposite the spot where Bassam and Ja'far Mustafa were herding livestock, an Israel Defense Forces patrol comprising a Defender vehicle appeared in Israeli territory. Three soldiers disembarked and launched two percussion grenades and three smoke bombs in the direction of the two herders. The bombs landed inside Lebanese territory without causing injury.	The Israel Defense Forces is not familiar with this incident. We ask to receive more details on the matter in order to investigate it fully.
13 February	0830	On the outskirts of the town of Wazzani, opposite the spot where Bassam and Ja'far Mustafa and Yusuf Muhammad were herding livestock, approximately 100 metres from the technical fence, an Israel Defense Forces patrol comprising two Hummer vehicles appeared in Israeli territory. Three soldiers disembarked and launched three smoke bombs in the direction of the herders. The bombs landed inside Lebanese territory without causing injury.	There was no crossing of the Blue Line. This incident does not qualify as a violation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) or the Blue Line. The Israel Defense Forces instructs its soldiers to avoid any inappropriate behaviour along the contact line in order to prevent unnecessary friction. The Israel Defense Forces is familiar with this incident and has investigated it internally. The soldier who threw the smoke bombs was appropriately disciplined.
15 February	0900	At Zabdin Farm, in the Mount Dov area, an Israel Defense Forces force uprooted olive and oak trees next to two of its positions, using a D9 bulldozer escorted by three Merkava tanks and two Hummer vehicles. The Israel Defense Forces finished its activities at 1615 hours.	This incident does not qualify as a violation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) or the Blue Line. With that being said, it should be emphasized that the Israel Defense Forces will fulfil its responsibility to protect the sovereignty of the State of Israel and will maintain the safety of its people. The Israel Defense Forces will take all necessary action in order to preserve the state of calm in the area.

Date	*Time*	*Alleged nature of incident*	*Response*
	1110	From inside Israeli territory opposite Labbunah, an Israel Defense Forces force in the Jall al-Alam position aimed their weapons at a Lebanese Army patrol.	Israel Defense Forces soldiers position their weapons in the direction from which they identify a threat; the soldiers did not actively point their weapons with the intention to shoot.
	1140	From inside Israeli territory opposite Labbunah, an Israel Defense Forces force launched a smoke bomb from its Jall al-Alam position towards the dirt road leading to the aforementioned position alongside a Lebanese Army patrol that was conducting a routine border reconnaissance mission. There were no injuries.	This incident does not qualify as a violation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) or the Blue Line. The smoke bomb landed inside Israeli territory. It should be mentioned that the smoke bomb was thrown in response to suspicious activity by Lebanese Armed Forces soldiers with the terror organization Hezbollah.
16 February	1030	At Zabdin Farm, inside the Mount Dov area, an Israel Defense Forces force continued the work it had begun on 15 February, using three D9 bulldozers escorted by a patrol comprising three Merkava tanks and two Hummer vehicles.	This incident does not qualify as a violation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) or the Blue Line. With that being said, it should be emphasized that the Israel Defense Forces will fulfil its responsibility to protect the sovereignty of the State of Israel and will maintain the safety of its people. In the past, the terror organization Hezbollah has taken advantage of similar weak spots to carry out attacks. The Israel Defense Forces will take all necessary action in order to preserve the state of calm in the area.
17 February	1030	From inside Israeli territory, near the Jall al-Alam position opposite Labbunah, an Israel Defense Forces patrol launched a camouflage smoke bomb that landed inside Israeli territory while a Lebanese Army patrol was present on the Lebanese side. The smoke caused a soldier to become ill.	This incident does not qualify as a violation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) or the Blue Line.
18 February	1430	Inside Israeli territory, opposite Kafr Killa, an Israel Defense Forces patrol comprising three Hummer vehicles and a Defender vehicle appeared. Twelve soldiers disembarked, three of whom aimed their personal weapons in the direction of passers-by on the Lebanese side. The patrol left at 1500 hours.	The Israel Defense Forces is not familiar with this incident. We ask to receive more details on the matter in order to investigate it fully.

Date	*Time*	*Alleged nature of incident*	*Response*
24 February	0750-1000	In the Mount Dov area, near the Ruwaysat al-Alam post, several bursts of medium automatic-weapon fire were heard.	This incident does not qualify as a violation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) or the Blue Line.
	0900	At Zabdin Farm, inside the Mount Dov area, an Israel Defense Forces force bulldozed forested land and fortified its position at that location, using a D9 bulldozer and a trench digger, escorted by a patrol comprising a Merkava tank, a personnel carrier, three Defender vehicles and a Hummer vehicle. At 1745 hours, the Israel Defense Forces force finished its activities, and the vehicles and the patrol left in the direction of the Zabdin post.	This incident does not qualify as a violation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) or the Blue Line. With that being said, it should be emphasized that the Israel Defense Forces will fulfil its responsibility to protect the sovereignty of the State of Israel and will maintain the safety of its people. The Israel Defense Forces will take all necessary action in order to preserve the state of calm in the area.
	1336	An Israel Defense Forces patrol comprising a Memugan vehicle and four soldiers violated the line of withdrawal in the northern part of the town of Ghajar, towards the Wazzani-Abbasiyah area. It observed Lebanese territory for two minutes before returning in the direction of the town of Ghajar.	This incident does not qualify as a violation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) or the Blue Line, as the area in question is an Israeli military post that is located in Israeli territory south of the Blue Line.
	1910	An Israel Defense Forces force fired a flare over a radar post. In addition, several bursts of medium-weapon fire were heard in the area around the aforementioned post.	This incident does not qualify as a violation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) or the Blue Line.
25 February	0930	At Zabdin Farm, in the Mount Dov area, an Israel Defense Forces force used a D9 bulldozer and a trench digger to bulldoze forested land. Those vehicles were escorted by a patrol comprising a Merkava tank, an armoured personnel carrier, two Defender vehicles and three Hummer vehicles. At 1700 hours, the Israel Defense Forces force finished its activities and left.	This incident does not qualify as a violation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) or the Blue Line. With that being said, it should be emphasized that the Israel Defense Forces will fulfil its responsibility to protect the sovereignty of the State of Israel and will maintain the safety of its people. The Israel Defense Forces will take all necessary action in order to preserve the state of calm in the area.
	1225	At Sheikh Abbad-Hula, while the Lebanese Army was conducting a patrol, an Israel Defense Forces patrol comprising a Hummer vehicle appeared. Four soldiers disembarked, one of whom took photographs and aimed a weapon in	There was no crossing of the Blue Line. This incident does not qualify as a violation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) or the Blue Line.

Date	*Time*	*Alleged nature of incident*	*Response*
		the direction of the Lebanese Army patrol. The soldiers also made obscene gestures at Lebanese Army soldiers. The Israel Defense Forces patrol left in the direction of Israeli territory at 1240 hours.	The Israel Defense Forces instructs its soldiers to avoid inappropriate behaviour along the contact line in order to avoid unnecessary friction. Disciplinary issues will be dealt with in cases where Israel Defense Forces soldiers act against orders or the moral code of the Israel Defense Forces. With that being said, this sort of behaviour does not qualify as a violation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006).
26 February	0830-1000	Inside the Mount Dov area, an Israel Defense Forces force fired light automatic weapons from inside the Zabdin post in the direction of the surrounding area.	This incident does not qualify as a violation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) or the Blue Line.
27 February	0930	Inside Israeli territory at Misgav Am, opposite the town of Udaysah, an Israel Defense Forces patrol comprising a Defender vehicle and two civilian automobiles appeared. Patrol soldiers raised a camera on a five-metre pole mounted on the Defender vehicle and pointed it in the direction of Lebanese territory.	The Israel Defense Forces patrol did not cross the Blue Line. This incident does not qualify as a violation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) or the Blue Line.
	2125-2145	An Israel Defense Forces force fired four flares over the radar position inside the Mount Dov area.	This incident does not qualify as a violation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) or the Blue Line.
28 February	1630-1745	Several explosions were heard from inside the Mount Dov area.	This incident does not qualify as a violation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) or the Blue Line.
	1700	Opposite Hasan Gate position 2, at Kafr Shuba, six cows crossed the line of withdrawal from Israeli territory into Lebanese territory. The cows returned to Israeli territory at 1730 hours.	The Israel Defense Forces is not familiar with this incident. We ask to receive more details on the matter in order to investigate it fully.
29 February	1100-1600	Inside the Mount Dov area, an Israel Defense Forces force used four bulldozers to bulldoze dirt and trees on the road at its Zabdin post.	This incident does not qualify as a violation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) or the Blue Line.

Annex II: Israel's response to the alleged accusations: March 2016

Date	*Time*	*Alleged nature of incident*	*Response*
1 March	0920	At Zabdin Farm, inside the Mount Dov area, an Israel Defense Forces force bulldozed land planted with olive and oak trees, using two D9 bulldozers and a tracked bulldozer escorted by a patrol comprising a Merkava tank, a personnel carrier and a Defender vehicle. The Israel Defense Forces force finished its work at 1630 hours and the patrol and vehicles left in the direction of the Zabdin post.	This incident does not qualify as a violation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) or the Blue Line. With that being said, it should be emphasized that the Israel Defense Forces will fulfil its responsibility to protect the sovereignty of the State of Israel and will maintain the safety of its people. In the past, the terror organization Hezbollah has taken advantage of similar weak spots to carry out attacks. The Israel Defense Forces will take all necessary action in order to preserve the state of calm in the area.
	1445	From inside Israeli territory, opposite the Lebanese Army B'ir Shu'ayb observation point, an Israel Defense Forces patrol comprising two vehicles appeared. Five soldiers disembarked and shouted curses at personnel at the observation point. They left at 1455 hours.	There was no crossing of the Blue Line. This incident does not qualify as a violation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) or the Blue Line. The Israel Defense Forces instructs its soldiers to avoid inappropriate behaviour along the contact line in order to avoid unnecessary friction. Disciplinary issues will be dealt with in cases where Israel Defense Forces soldiers act against orders or the moral code of the Israel Defense Forces.
	1755	Opposite Birkat Ba'tha'il-Kafr Shuba, 30 cows crossed the Blue Line from Israeli territory into Lebanese territory. The cows returned to Israeli territory at 1845 hours.	The Israel Defense Forces is not familiar with this incident. We ask to receive more details on the matter in order to investigate it fully.
2 March	1100	From inside Israeli territory, opposite the town of Kafr Killa, an Israel Defense Forces patrol comprising a Hummer vehicle, a Defender vehicle and another vehicle appeared. Eight soldiers disembarked to perform maintenance on border fence cameras, and one of them aimed a 12.7 mm machine gun mounted on the Hummer vehicle in the direction of Lebanese territory. The patrol left at 1145 hours.	There was no crossing of the Blue Line. This incident does not qualify as a violation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) or the Blue Line. Israel Defense Forces soldiers position their weapons in the direction from which they identify a threat; the soldiers did not actively point their weapons with the intention to shoot.

Date	*Time*	*Alleged nature of incident*	*Response*
	1500-1600	Inside the Mount Dov area, an Israel Defense Forces force conducted an exercise during which it fired approximately 15 shells at the perimeters of its Fashkul, Zabdin, Ramta and Summaqah posts.	The shells were fired in Israeli territory. This incident does not qualify as a violation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) or the Blue Line.
3 March	1100-1700	Inside the Mount Dov area, an Israel Defense Forces force used three bulldozers to bulldoze dirt and trees on the road leading to the Zabdin 2 post.	This incident does not qualify as a violation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) or the Blue Line. With that being said, it should be emphasized that the Israel Defense Forces will fulfil its responsibility to protect the sovereignty of the State of Israel and will maintain the safety of its people. In the past, the terror organization Hezbollah has taken advantage of similar weak spots to carry out attacks. The Israel Defense Forces will take all necessary action in order to preserve the state of calm in the area.
5 March	1130	From inside Israeli territory, opposite the Udaysah checkpoint (TP37), an Israel Defense Forces patrol comprising two Hummer vehicles and a construction vehicle appeared. It performed maintenance on the technical fence and replaced a sensor device. Patrol personnel also aimed a 12.7 mm machine gun in the direction of Lebanese territory. The patrol left at 1145 hours.	There was no crossing of the Blue Line. This incident does not qualify as a violation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) or the Blue Line. Israel Defense Forces soldiers position their weapons in the direction from which they identify a threat; the soldiers did not actively point their weapons with the intention to shoot.
	1320	From inside Israeli territory, opposite the town of Mays al-Jabal, an Israel Defense Forces patrol threw six smoke bombs towards Lebanese territory. At 1340 hours, soldiers moved to point BP31 and threw three smoke bombs towards Lebanese territory.	This incident does not qualify as a violation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) or the Blue Line. It should be mentioned that the smoke bombs fell in Israeli territory, without crossing the Blue Line. The smoke bombs were thrown in response to the crossing of the Blue Line by Hezbollah operatives.
6 March	0930-1000	Inside the Mount Dov area, an Israel Defense Forces force fired light and medium automatic weapons and threw smoke bombs at the area around the Ruwaysat al-Alam post.	This incident does not qualify as a violation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) or the Blue Line.

Date	*Time*	*Alleged nature of incident*	*Response*
7 March	1425	Opposite Sahl al-Khiyam, while civilian Ali Sarhan was herding livestock, an Israel Defense Forces patrol appeared from inside Israeli territory. One of the soldiers fired a weapon into the air in the direction of Lebanese territory. The Israel Defense Forces force then left the area.	The Israel Defense Forces is not familiar with this incident. We ask to receive more details on the matter in order to investigate it fully.
8 March	0830	Inside Israeli territory, at the Ruwaysah post opposite the town of Mays al-Jabal, an Israel Defense Forces force installed a two-metre pole on which a surveillance camera was mounted and pointed it in the direction of Lebanese territory.	This incident does not qualify as a violation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) or the Blue Line, as the area in question is an Israeli military post that is located in Israeli territory south of the Blue Line.
	1030	From inside Israeli territory, opposite Kafr Killa, an Israel Defense Forces patrol comprising a Hummer vehicle, two Defender vehicles and a construction vehicle appeared. Some 10 soldiers disembarked to perform maintenance on cameras mounted on the fence while some of them aimed their weapons in the direction of Lebanese territory. The patrol and vehicles left at 1055 hours.	There was no crossing of the Blue Line. This incident does not qualify as a violation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) or the Blue Line. Israel Defense Forces soldiers position their weapons in the direction from which they identify a threat; the soldiers did not actively point their weapons with the intention to shoot.
	1100	An Israel Defense Forces force used several military and civilian construction vehicles escorted by a military patrol to widen the road along the technical fence next to the Israeli E452 post, south of Amrah in the area to which Lebanon alleges a claim. The Israel Defense Forces force finished its work at 1730 hours.	This incident does not qualify as a violation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) or the Blue Line.
	1215	While a herd of goats was grazing near Birkat Ba'tha'il south of Kafr Shuba, an Israel Defense Forces patrol appeared from inside Israeli territory and fired weapons into the air in the direction of Lebanese territory.	This incident does not qualify as a violation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) or the Blue Line. The Israel Defense Forces force fired into the air in Israeli territory in order to warn a shepherd who was standing on the Blue Line with his flock. The bullets that were fired did not cross the Blue Line.

Date	*Time*	*Alleged nature of incident*	*Response*
	1630	Inside the Mount Dov Area, an Israel Defense Forces force fired medium and light weapons in the area around its posts.	This incident does not qualify as a violation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) or the Blue Line.
9 March	1030	Near point B90 opposite Kafr Killa meadow, an Israel Defense Forces patrol comprising a Hummer vehicle, a Defender vehicle and 10 soldiers appeared. The soldiers threw five smoke bombs into Lebanese territory and assumed combat positions, pointing their weapons at Lebanese territory.	This incident does not qualify as a violation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) or the Blue Line. It should be mentioned that the smoke bombs were thrown in Israeli territory, without crossing the Blue Line. The smoke bombs were thrown in response to suspicious activity by the terror organization Hezbollah. Israel Defense Forces soldiers position their weapons in the direction from which they identify a threat; the soldiers did not actively point their weapons with the intention to shoot.
	1250	An Israel Defense Forces force used several military and civilian construction vehicles escorted by a patrol to continue the work that it had begun on 8 March of widening the road along the technical fence next to the Israeli E452 post, south of Amrah, in the area to which Lebanon alleges a claim. The Israel Defense Forces force finished its work at 1730 hours.	There was no crossing of the Blue Line. This incident does not qualify as a violation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) or the Blue Line.
10 March	0800	Opposite the town of Sardah, an Israel Defense Forces patrol comprising two Defender vehicles, a Hummer vehicle, a bulldozer and eight soldiers appeared. The bulldozer proceeded to widen the road along the technical fence, while members of the patrol aimed their weapons in the direction of Lebanese territory. The patrol left at 1300 hours.	There was no crossing of the Blue Line. This incident does not qualify as a violation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) or the Blue Line. Israel Defense Forces soldiers position their weapons in the direction from which they identify a threat; the soldiers did not actively point their weapons with the intention to shoot.
	1000	An Israel Defense Forces force used several military and civilian construction vehicles escorted by an Israel Defense Forces patrol to continue the work that it had begun on 8 March of widening the road along the technical fence next to the Israeli E452 post, south of Amrah, in the area to which Lebanon alleges a claim. The Israel Defense Forces force finished its work at 1750 hours.	There was no crossing of the Blue Line. This incident does not qualify as a violation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) or the Blue Line.

Date	*Time*	*Alleged nature of incident*	*Response*
	1030	Opposite the town of Ayta al-Sha'b, at the Lebanese Army's Hadab post, an Israel Defense Forces patrol consisting of three vehicles, a Defender vehicle, approximately 26 soldiers and two dogs appeared. Patrol personnel aimed their weapons in the direction of the Lebanese Army post, and one of the soldiers threw a smoke bomb that landed !sraeli territory.	There was no crossing of the Blue Line. This incident does not qualify as a violation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) or the Blue Line. Israel Defense Forces soldiers position their weapons in the direction from which they identify a threat; the soldiers did not actively point their weapons with the intention to shoot.
	1200-1405	Opposite the town of Ayta al-Sha'b, at the Rahib Hill post, an Israel Defense Forces force installed a camera on a previously existing metal tower and pointed it in the direction of Lebanese territory.	This incident does not qualify as a violation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) or the Blue Line, as the area in question is an Israeli military post that is located in Israeli territory south of the Blue Line.
11 March	0900	Inside the town of Ghajar, opposite the Lebanese Army Wazzani Hill post, an Israel Defense Forces Humvee vehicle appeared with three soldiers inside. The soldiers pointed a camera mounted on a pole inside the vehicle towards Lebanese territory. The vehicle left at 0805 hours on 13 March.	This incident does not qualify as a violation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) or the Blue Line, as the area in question is an Israeli military post that is located in Israeli territory south of the Blue Line.
	1400	From inside Israeli territory, opposite Kafr Killa, an Israel Defense Forces patrol comprising two Humvee vehicles and a Defender vehicle appeared. Nine soldiers disembarked in order to inspect the technical fence. They also aimed their weapons and a 12.7 mm machine gun in the direction of Lebanese territory. They left at 1415 hours.	There was no crossing of the Blue Line. This incident does not qualify as a violation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) or the Blue Line. Israel Defense Forces soldiers position their weapons in the direction from which they identify a threat; the soldiers did not actively point their weapons with the intention to shoot.
13 March	1215	Inside Israeli territory, opposite Labbunah, in the area around point B3, Israel Defense Forces soldiers aimed their personal weapons in the direction of Lebanese Army soldiers as they were inspecting the area around certain points where observation towers will be installed.	There was no crossing of the Blue Line. This incident does not qualify as a violation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) or the Blue Line. Israel Defense Forces soldiers position their weapons in the direction from which they identify a threat; the soldiers did not actively point their weapons with the intention to shoot.

Date	*Time*	*Alleged nature of incident*	*Response*
15 March	0150-0240	Opposite Udaysah (point TP37), an Israel Defense Forces patrol comprising eight soldiers, a bulldozer and a light vehicle appeared and entered the area to which Lebanon alleges a claim. The bulldozer removed some barriers and brush.	This incident does not qualify as a violation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) or the Blue Line. With that being said, it should be emphasized that the Israel Defense Forces will fulfil its responsibility to protect the sovereignty of the State of Israel and will maintain the safety of its people. In the past, the terror organization Hezbollah has taken advantage of similar weak spots to carry out attacks. The Israel Defense Forces will take all necessary action in order to preserve the state of calm in the area.
	1140	Opposite Udaysah (point TP37), an Israel Defense Forces patrol comprising a Defender vehicle appeared. Four soldiers disembarked and performed maintenance on the technical fence. The patrol left at 1155 hours.	This incident does not qualify as a violation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) or the Blue Line.
	1700-1710	Opposite Udaysah (point TP37), while seven Lebanese workers were doing work in the area, an Israel Defense Forces patrol appeared and the soldiers aimed their weapons towards the workers.	There was no crossing of the Blue Line. This incident does not qualify as a violation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) or the Blue Line. Israel Defense Forces soldiers position their weapons in the direction from which they identify a threat; the soldiers did not actively point their weapons with the intention to shoot.
	2250	Opposite Udaysah (point TP37), an Israel Defense Forces force fired two flares from inside Israeli territory over the area to which Lebanon alleges a claim.	This incident does not qualify as a violation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) or the Blue Line.
21 March	0930	Inside Israeli territory opposite Udaysah (point TP37), an Israel Defense Forces patrol comprising a winch, a crane, a bulldozer, two Hummer vehicles and two trucks appeared and set up 12 cement	Israel Defense Forces soldiers position their weapons in the direction from which they identify a threat; the soldiers did not actively point their weapons with the intention to shoot.

Date	*Time*	*Alleged nature of incident*	*Response*
		blocks in a T configuration near the technical fence. During the work, patrol personnel aimed a 12.7 mm machine gun mounted on the Hummer vehicle in the direction of Lebanese territory. The patrol left at 1705 hours, except for a construction vehicle equipped with cameras that remained at the site and photographed Lebanese territory.	This incident does not qualify as a violation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) or the Blue Line, as the area in question is an Israeli military post that is located in Israeli territory south of the Blue Line.
22 March	1440	Inside Israeli territory, opposite the town of Rumaysh, near the Israeli Khallat Budiyah 1 post, a bulldozer crossed the technical fence and smoothed out the dirt road between points B38 and B39, without violating the Blue Line. The work ended at 1600 hours, and the patrol left.	This incident does not qualify as a violation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) or the Blue Line. With that being said, it should be emphasized that the Israel Defense Forces will fulfil its responsibility to protect the sovereignty of the State of Israel and will maintain the safety of its people. In the past, the terror organization Hezbollah has taken advantage of similar weak spots to carry out attacks. The Israel Defense Forces will take all necessary action in order to preserve the state of calm in the area.
23 March	1620	At the outskirts of Kafr Shuba, an Israel Defense Forces foot patrol violated the line of withdrawal, crossing some 30 metres into Lebanese territory, and tried unsuccessfully to abduct herder Isma'il Zahrah and a herd of goats. The patrol left in the direction of the Mount Dov area at 1625 hours.	The Israel Defense Forces soldiers did not cross the Blue Line. This incident does not qualify as a violation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) or the Blue Line.
29 March	0945	From inside Israeli territory opposite Labbunah, Israel Defense Forces soldiers aimed automatic weapons in the direction of Lebanese Army patrol personnel.	Israel Defense Forces soldiers position their weapons in the direction from which they identify a threat; the soldiers did not actively point their weapons with the intention to shoot.
30 March	2220-2245	Several explosions were heard from inside the Mount Dov area.	This incident does not qualify as a violation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) or the Blue Line.

Annex III: Israel's response to the alleged accusations: April 2016

Date	*Time*	*Alleged nature of incident*	*Response*
6 April	0855	Opposite the town of Blida near point BP28, as an Israel Defense Forces patrol comprising four vehicles was passing, its soldiers threw a smoke bomb from opposite the above-mentioned point. The smoke bomb landed inside Israeli territory.	This incident does not qualify as a violation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) or the Blue Line.
9 April	2320-2330	Inside the Mount Dov area, an Israel Defense Forces force fired two flares over an Israel Defense Forces radar position.	This incident does not qualify as a violation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) or the Blue Line.
10 April	2315-2325	Three explosions were heard from inside the Mount Dov area.	This incident does not qualify as a violation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) or the Blue Line.
16 April	0242	From inside Israeli territory, near the Israel Defense Forces position opposite the town of Ramiya, two Israel Defense Forces Humvee vehicles approached. The soldiers deliberately directed searchlights 20 metres into Lebanese territory for seven minutes.	This incident does not qualify as a violation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) or the Blue Line.
17 April	0225	Inside Israeli territory, as an Israel Defense Forces Humvee vehicle was moving from its position in Birkat Risha to its position north of the Zar'it base, the soldiers deliberately directed a searchlight 20 metres into Lebanese territory for 12 minutes.	This incident does not qualify as a violation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) or the Blue Line.
23 April	1510	An Israel Defense Forces Hummer vehicle mounted with surveillance cameras appeared near the town of Ghajar and an emplacement opposite the Lebanese Army's Tallat al-Wazzani position. The vehicle pointed a camera at Lebanese territory.	This incident does not qualify as a violation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) or the Blue Line. With that being said, it should be emphasized that the Israel Defense Forces will fulfil its responsibility to protect the sovereignty of the State of Israel and will maintain the safety of its people. The Israel Defense Forces will take all necessary action in order to preserve the state of calm in the area.
25 April	1320	From inside Israeli territory at point TP36 opposite the town of Udaysah, an Israel Defense Forces patrol comprising a Hummer vehicle and two Defender	There was no crossing of the Blue Line. This incident does not qualify as a violation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) or the Blue Line.

Date	Time	Alleged nature of incident	Response
		vehicles approached, and15 soldiers disembarked, carrying maps. They photographed Lebanese territory and the Hummer vehicle pointed a 12.7 mm machine gun at Lebanese territory. The vehicles and soldiers left at 1350 hours.	With that being said, it should be emphasized that the Israel Defense Forces will fulfil its responsibility to protect the sovereignty of the State of Israel and will maintain the safety of its people. The Israel Defense Forces will take all necessary action in order to preserve the state of calm in the area. Israel Defense Forces soldiers position their weapons in the direction from which they identify a threat; the soldiers did not actively point their weapons with the intention to shoot.
26 April	1000	From inside Israeli territory, at the Ruwaysah position opposite the village of Mays al-Jabal, an Israel Defense Forces force stationed a Raccoon Stalker vehicle with its surveillance camera pointed at Lebanese territory. The vehicle left at 1020 hours on 28 April.	This incident does not qualify as a violation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) or the Blue Line. With that being said, it should be emphasized that the Israel Defense Forces will fulfil its responsibility to protect the sovereignty of the State of Israel and will maintain the safety of its people. The Israel Defense Forces will take all necessary action in order to preserve the state of calm in the area.
27 April	0900	Opposite the town of Mays al-Jabal, some 23 Israel Defense Forces soldiers and a dog crossed the technical fence opposite point B64. They patrolled the area between that point and point B65. They then violated the Blue Line at point B64 by some 10 metres for five minutes, covered by a Merkava tank stationed inside Israeli territory. At 1110 hours, the soldiers threw two smoke bombs opposite point B64. The smoke bombs landed between the technical fence and the Blue Line. They left the area opposite point B64 at 1115 hours.	This was a standard Israel Defense Forces activity that took place in the vicinity of Rakefet. We would like to emphasize that, contrary to the Lebanese claim, the blue Line was not crossed by Israel Defense Forces soldiers. Therefore, this incident does not qualify as a violation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) or the Blue Line. As for the Lebanese claims regarding the crossing of the technical fence, it should be emphasized that crossing the technical fence at the above-mentioned points does not qualify as a violation of the Blue Line. Israel reserves its right to operate in these locations. This right was also recognized by UNIFIL.

Date	*Time*	*Alleged nature of incident*	*Response*
	1345	At the outskirts of the town of Shab'a in the Shahl area, opposite observation point OP2 of the Indian contingent of UNIFIL, an Israel Defense Forces foot patrol tried unsuccessfully to abduct herder Mahir Hamdan, who fled with his livestock in the direction of the town of Shab'a.	There was no attempt by the Israel Defense Forces to kidnap the herder. This incident does not qualify as a violation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) or the Blue Line.

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Seventieth session
Agenda item 72 (c)
Promotion and protection of human rights: human rights situations and reports of special rapporteurs and representatives

Security Council
Seventy-first year

Letter dated 15 July 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to enclose herewith the Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine on the thematic report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights entitled, "Accountability for killings in Ukraine from January 2014 to May 2016" (see annex).

I would appreciate your having the present letter and its annex distributed as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 72 (c), and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Volodymyr **Yelchenko**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

16-12485 (E) 250716

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Annex to the letter dated 15 July 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine on the thematic report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights entitled, "Accountability for killings in Ukraine from January 2014 to May 2016"

Ukraine highly appreciates the work of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) aimed at identifying and eliminating the serious problems in the human rights protection system and supports its efforts to promote international human rights principles and standards in order to prevent grave human rights violations in the future.

The report of OHCHR entitled, "Accountability for killings in Ukraine from January 2014 to May 2016" once again highlights that the majority of casualties in Ukraine were caused by the armed conflict, which is continually fuelled by the influx of foreign fighters, including former and present military personnel, as well as weapons from the Russian Federation. Unfortunately, the majority of the civilian casualties were caused by the shelling of residential areas by illegal armed groups. Ukrainian armed forces are prohibited from firing at positions of militants located in the areas inhabited by civilians.

We stress the exceptional importance of conducting a comprehensive investigation and analysis of the casualties resulting from the illegal occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and from Russian military aggression in Donbas.

In this regard, it becomes a matter of crucial importance to document the facts surrounding civilian deaths caused by military actions, as well as arbitrary executions and torture leading to death by illegal armed groups in Donbas and by the Russian occupying forces. Such documentation will eventually make it possible to establish the facts of the war and other crimes and bring all perpetrators to justice. We emphasize that Ukraine will not tolerate impunity and will investigate all facts pertaining to human rights abuses.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine highly appreciates the initiative of OHCHR and the United Nations human rights monitoring mission in Ukraine in preparing the first thematic report and is ready to cooperate on implementing its recommendations.

We hope that OHCHR will continue to prepare its thematic reports and believe that one of them will be dedicated to the human rights situation in the illegally occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol where the systematic abuses of human rights by the Russian Federation are continuing to take place.

Ukraine calls upon the international community to intensify the pressure on the Russian Federation and armed groups under its control to put an end to arbitrary deprivation of life and all other human rights abuses.

United Nations S/2016/626

Security Council

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18 July 2016

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Letter dated 17 July 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Upon instructions from my Government, my delegation will refrain from participating in the meeting of the Security Council to consider the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2016/589), as we consider the report and any consideration thereof to be in total contravention of the letter and spirit of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and even resolution 2231 (2015) itself for the following reasons:

1. While, in the note of the President of the Security Council (S/2016/44), the Secretary-General was clearly mandated, in paragraph 7, "to report to the Security Council every six months on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015)", the report is predicated solely on a reference in annex B of the resolution, which contains a proposal by six Member States that "the Security Council ask the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the implementation of these provisions every six months", and not on a decision by the Council, which is incorporated later into the note referred to above. The last sentence of paragraph 3 of the report and the word "request" in the following paragraph are reflective of the incorrect understanding by the Secretariat of the mandate received from the Council. A similar mandate is given to the facilitator in paragraph 3 of note 2016/44, which reads, "The facilitator shall brief the other members of the Council on its work and the implementation of the resolution every six months." It is evident that resolution 2231 (2015) consists of the body of the resolution plus its annexes A and B. It is equally evident that the report of the Secretary-General and the facilitator should cover resolution 2231 (2015) in its entirety, including its annex A, containing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which is recognized globally as a historic diplomatic achievement, is endorsed by the Security Council and constitutes the core of resolution 2231 (2015). Any report should take into full account the raison d'être of the Plan of Action and its critical function in resolving a long-standing international issue.

2. As a result of the misinterpretation of the mandate, as explained above, the drafters of the report have overrated annex B at the expense of resolution 2231 (2015) itself and its most important part, that is, the text of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, and the obligations therein, contained in annex A. The drafters of the report have also totally ignored the objectives and spirit of the Iran-E3/EU+3 negotiations and the *travaux préparatoires* of the Plan of Action.

3. We believe that the report is also contradictory to the change of paradigm and tone that the Security Council itself has unambiguously set for post-Plan of Action relations between Iran and the Council by affirming that conclusion of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action marks a fundamental shift in its consideration of this issue, and expressing its desire to build a new relationship with Iran strengthened by the implementation of the Plan of Action. The language of the report continues to adhere to the old pattern, which is reflective of the outdated confrontational approach that used to characterize the pre-Plan of Action period.

4. It is important to note that resolution 2231 (2015) unambiguously considers the "conclusion" and "implementation" of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, and not annex B of the resolution nor even the resolution itself, as the basis for this "fundamental shift". Iran has fully honoured its commitments under the Plan of Action, as verified repeatedly by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and, at the very least, expects to see this "fundamental shift" in its treatment by the Security Council and the Secretary-General. It is unfortunate that this first report on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) does not live up to that expectation, is devoid of taking into account the "fundamental shift" in the Security Council's consideration of this issue and fails to indicate the building of a new relationship with Iran.

5. The imprudence shown in the report may cause irreparable harm to the historic, yet vulnerable, nuclear deal, which has already been subjected to justifiable criticism due to the failure of the United States to abide fully by its commitments. The drafters of the report seem to have neglected the fact that pressure, intimidation and disinformation against Iran in the past failed miserably to achieve any goals, and only reciprocal gains can make international regimes and agreements, including the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, sustainable. The Iranian leadership and people rightly feel that Iran has yet to receive tangible economic dividends from its faithful implementation of the Plan of Action. While Iran has made a full investment in compliance by verifiably fulfilling its obligations under the Plan of Action, the changes in the economic environment have been incremental, very slow and cumbersome. The report adds insult to injury, making habitual adverse, unsubstantiated and irrelevant politically motivated assertions against Iran. In the face of the slow removal of the impediments to full enjoyment by Iran of economic promises made through the Plan of Action, this report undermines even its political dividends.

6. We believe that, in failing to reflect that "fundamental shift", the first report on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), has exposed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action to undue distress by being unbalanced, one-sided, biased and judgmental, reminiscent of the pre-Plan of Action attitude shown by the United Nations towards Iran.

7. The drafters of the report, who have never been involved in negotiating or implementing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, have evidently underestimated, in fact taken for granted, Iran's IAEA-verified full compliance with its Plan of Action commitments. They have further brushed aside the globally acknowledged shortcomings with respect to the impact of sanctions-lifting provisions of the resolution and its annex A. At the same time, the report has failed to note Iran's clearly stated positions contained in document S/2015/550 and has also disproportionately exaggerated unverified allegations of Iran's conduct vis-à-vis

certain provisions of annex B by passing extralegal judgments even outside the scope of the resolution and its annexes.

8. The report has chosen to ignore or explain away Iran's grievances regarding the effective non-performance by certain Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action participants. The report has, instead, explained those failures away by stating that implementation challenges exist for any agreement, let alone one as comprehensive and complex as this Plan of Action. This selective approach has made the report one-sided and unbalanced. The drafters of the report were expected to urge the United States, and the E3/EU+3 as a whole, to implement their sanctions-lifting commitments under the Plan of Action.

9. In sharp contrast to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the report has repeated and elaborated, in detail, three instances of Iran's alleged conduct vis-à-vis certain provisions of annex B, mostly based on information received from open sources or from one particular Security Council Member State, without much regard for Iran's view on each allegation. The report's proclamation of the intention to pursue these allegations signals the continuation of pre-Plan of Action attitudes based on pre-disposition, hostility and disinformation. While we had hoped to count the Secretariat among the proponents of the Plan of Action, this proclivity would not help advance the goals of this major deal.

10. The Secretariat quotes the United States and the E3, alleging, without even enjoying the support of other Plan of Action participants, that Iran's recent ballistic missile launches were inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015), and calls upon Iran to avoid such activities because they might potentially "increase tensions in the region". This new concept, coined by the United States and repeated by the drafters of the report, goes beyond the mandate of the Secretary-General and is extraneous to the subject of resolution 2231 (2015). Furthermore, as clearly articulated in the statement of the Islamic Republic of Iran following the adoption of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) endorsing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (S/2015/550), even the phraseology of annex B of resolution 2231 (2015) with respect to Iran's ballistic missile programme leaves no doubt that Iran's recent launches could not be qualified as being inconsistent with annex B of the resolution, since they are not "designed" to be capable of delivering nuclear warheads. The deliberate addition of the phrase "designed to be" to the wording "capable of delivering nuclear weapons" used in terminated Security Council resolution 1929 (2010), was a deliberate modification following lengthy negotiations in order to exclude Iran's defensive missile programme "designed" exclusively for conventional warheads. The fact that Iran has never been on the path to acquiring nuclear weapons, and is committed by the Plan of Action not to follow such a path, makes the accusations against our conventional missile programme all the more irrelevant and extraneous. This and other wording modifications, and the context of the relevant part of annex B, signify the intention of the Security Council to modify its tone on the missile issue and make it all a non-obligatory invitation to Iran.

11. The report seems to suggest that resolution 2231 (2015) has "established" a new "2231 list" of sanctioned entities and individuals. This is dangerously misleading, since resolution 2231 (2015) terminated all previous resolutions, including by delisting many entities and individuals listed under those resolutions. Those remaining entities and individuals from previous resolutions — never accepted by Iran, as also set out in document S/2015/550 — are set to be

delisted no later than eight years after Implementation Day, and earlier in all likelihood.

12. We did convey our views to the Secretariat in time to remedy the above-mentioned deficiencies and avoid undermining the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Producing a factual, balanced and relevant report, particularly by not justifying the globally recognized deficiencies in the fulfilment of sanctions-lifting obligations, and refraining from commenting on regional issues, which are absolutely extraneous to the letter and spirit of the resolution and its annexes, could have led to a forward-looking and constructive report that could have best served the Plan of Action against the existing challenges. It is unfortunate that the drafters of the report persisted in their biased approach and chose not to act within their clear mandate.

I would be grateful if you could have the present letter brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council before the scheduled meeting to consider the report and have it reflected in the proceedings of the meeting, as well as circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Gholamali **Khoshroo**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations S/2016/627

Security Council

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Report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed to Libya and neighbouring countries, including off the coast of Libya, by foreign terrorist fighters recruited by or joining Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 2292 (2016), in which the Council requested the Secretary-General to provide a report on the threat posed to Libya and neighbouring countries, including off the coast of Libya, by foreign terrorist fighters recruited by or joining Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Da'esh),[1] Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities.[2]

2. The report analyses both the threat that foreign terrorist fighters pose to the internal security in Libya, as well as the threat emanating from such fighters in Libya to neighbouring Member States. It also highlights the continuing challenges that both Libya and neighbouring Member States face in developing effective countermeasures. Lastly, the report provides an overview of United Nations capacity-building efforts to counter the threat of foreign terrorist fighters in Libya and neighbouring States.

II. Current situation in Libya

A. Overview of the security situation in Libya

Security arrangements of the Libyan Political Agreement

3. The full implementation of the Libyan Political Agreement, and specifically its transitional institutional framework, remains incomplete. The Libyan House of Representatives has yet to organize a vote to endorse the Government of National Accord. As a consequence, the executive and legislative branches of the Government of Libya operate independently of each other. Concerns among its

[1] ISIL is listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (permanent reference number QDe.115) by the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015).

[2] In my report dated 16 May 2016 on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya, a section was devoted to the ISIL presence (S/2016/452, paras. 21-26).

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leadership and some of the members of the House of Representatives about the structure of the Libyan army and the appointment of individuals to key military positions appear to be driving the House of Representatives' inaction.

4. While the Temporary Security Committee successfully helped to install the Presidential Council in Tripoli, it has yet to overcome the major challenge of expanding the control of the Government of National Accord over the capital. The full deployment of a presidential guard is awaited. A decision by the Government of National Accord on the structure and components of its armed forces, which would make it possible to distinguish between official security forces and armed groups, is also awaited. The Government of National Accord has not yet expressed itself on the status of units previously recognized by the House of Representatives.

Military operations against Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant in Sirte and Benghazi

5. The most active front of the conflict in Libya is around the town of Sirte, currently controlled by ISIL. At the time of reporting, the ISIL presence has been reduced to a small area of the town centre. The military operations are being conducted by armed groups, most of which are from the city of Misrata, in addition to forces from other western cities, such as Gharyan, Tripoli, Sabratha and Janzour. The military command of operation "Al-Bunyan Al-Marsous" nominally responds to the Government of National Accord.

6. Further east, the Libyan National Army is continuing its military operations against opposing armed groups, including ISIL. The army has increased its control over Benghazi, but some central districts (Sabri and fish market) and south-western areas of the city (Gwarsha and Ganfouda) remain contested. Both "Al-Bunyan Al-Marsous" and the army receive external military assistance.

7. In Sabratha, clashes broke out between local brigades and ISIL following an air strike against an ISIL position on 19 February 2016. In clashes occurring from 23 to 25 February, a coalition of local brigades under the authority of the local military council forced ISIL to leave the city. ISIL, however, still operates in the region stretching between Tripoli and the Tunisian border, especially in rural areas. Some foreign terrorist fighters have crossed back into Tunisia, while others scattered to Sirte, Tripoli and rural areas around Sabratha at the foot of the Nafusa Mountains. A few local ISIL fighters have found refuge within the city.

Risk of renewed escalation

8. The recent successes of armed groups fighting ISIL have increased their status. Subsequently, old antagonisms are resurfacing and tensions have increased. Renewed risks of escalation are most palpable in eastern cities. In Ajdabiya, on 18 June 2016, the newly created Benghazi Defence Companies launched an attack against the army positions to the south of the city. Their objective appears to be to join the armed conflict against the army in Benghazi. In Derna, the army repeatedly launched air strikes against civilian neighbourhoods, increasing the animosity between the army and the Derna Mujahedeen Shura Council,[3] which had previously

[3] The Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council and the Derna Mujahedeen Shura Council receive vocal and material support from supporters within Tripoli and Misrata; see the final report of the Panel of Experts on Libya established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) (S/2016/209, paras. 77-79).

pushed ISIL out of the town. On 3 May 2016, around Zillah (Jufra), forces affiliated with the army clashed with units from Misrata. In the wake of the clashes, the army took control of a number of oilfields in the Sirte basin.[4] Those incidents show that the fight against ISIL is not the only priority of the armed groups involved. They also raise questions about the aftermath of the operations against ISIL.

9. Meanwhile, competition between armed groups for control of Tripoli continues. Within the capital, armed groups have clashed on several occasions. In Janzour, the Mobile National Forces have clashed with the Fursan Janzour brigade. In the Abu Salim area, several skirmishes between the Abu Salim and the Salah Burki brigades have been reported. Outside of the town, armed groups from Zintan have threatened to return.

Foreign terrorist fighters and Libyan armed groups

10. The current political divide continues to make Libya attractive to foreign terrorist fighters. Libyan armed groups also actively recruit foreign terrorist fighters to boost their military capacities. Several Libyan armed groups are capable of mobilizing international networks of radicalized fighters, often because of historical ties.

11. In the north, ISIL has established itself in cities where radical movements, notably Ansar Al-Sharia,[5] have had a significant presence, specifically in Derna, Benghazi, Sirte and Sabratha. The successful establishment of Ansar Al-Sharia in those towns relied on the support provided by local sponsors. In spite of ideological and political differences between the two movements, ISIL and Ansar Al-Sharia have tried to avoid violent disputes, with mixed success. In some cases, they even established occasional collaboration. In Benghazi, for example, Ansar Al-Sharia and leaders from other armed groups within the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council coalition defended the option of an "alliance of convenience" with ISIL to fight the Libyan National Army until the end of 2015. Ansar Al-Sharia Benghazi (QDe.146) remains a part of the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council coalition of Libyan armed groups (see S/2016/209, paras. 74 and 75).

12. Other Libyan armed groups also maintain or have maintained ties with terrorist groups. For example, figures of influence in Misrata were temporarily connected to the ISIL leadership in Sirte and actively lobbied Brigade 166 to refrain from attacking Sirte in March 2015.[6] Similarly, links exist between ISIL and Al-Qaida-affiliated cells and Libyan armed groups in Tripoli, where ISIL cells (mostly composed of foreign terrorist fighters) have been offered housing facilities by a number of local militias, such as the Al-Tawhid brigade, whose leader was assassinated by the Special Deterrence Force in December 2015.[7]

13. The occasional collaboration between terrorist groups and a number of Libyan armed groups raises a number of questions concerning sponsorship offered by them for the presence of violent extremists in Libya. Such sponsors, but also others among Libya's political and military factions, could make further use of violent extremist networks in the ongoing political struggle.

[4] Libya Security Monitor, "May2016SigActs", 16 June 2016. Available from https://medium.com/libya-security-monitor.

[5] Listed as Ansar Al Charia Derna (QDe.145) and Ansar Al Charia Benghazi (QDe.146).

[6] "Deaths in clashes between Brigade 166 and ISIL in Sirte", *Al Jazeera* (Doha), 25 March 2015.

[7] "The killing of the commander of Al-Tawhid brigade in Tripoli", *Al-Wasat* (Manama), 4 December 2015.

14. In the south, Al-Qaida-affiliated groups such as the Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (QDe.014), Al Mourabitoun (QDe.141) and Ansar Eddine (QDe.135) have established a relatively long presence, building ties with local armed groups. Al-Qaida affiliates and Libyan armed groups share a common interest in weak State control, especially in relation to cross-border trafficking, which is the primary source of income for the latter group. Such arrangements are alliances of convenience and need constant renegotiation. Nevertheless, Mokhtar Belmokhtar (QDi.136), the leader of Al Mourabitoun, has spent several years in Libya and has built close relations with armed groups in Oubari and Derna. This has allowed him to travel across the country with relative ease, including the north-west. Iyad Ag Ghali (QDi.316), the leader of Ansar Eddine, has managed to maintain a foothold in southern Libya, where one of his sons is reportedly serving in an armed group. He uses this connection for access to supplies, including arms (see S/2016/209, para. 189 and annex 36).

15. Foreign ISIL operatives are relatively new to the area and are consequently less connected to local armed groups. Nevertheless, in order to ensure its south-eastern supply line from the Sudan and Egypt to Sirte, ISIL has struck a deal with Arab armed groups around Al Kufra to protect its convoys. Attempts by ISIL to infiltrate trafficking networks in the south-west, especially those protected by armed elements within the Tebu tribe, have largely failed.

16. While the defeat of ISIL in Sirte appears to be a distinct possibility, the south is considered the most obvious escape route for some foreign terrorist fighters. Therefore, while risks of westward movement, including to Tunisia, remain, the future impact of scattered ISIL combatants on southern local armed groups may become an issue of concern.

B. Threat posed by Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, Al-Qaida and associated groups

17. ISIL in Libya is a relatively new group and, to a certain extent, continues to be considered a foreign element by local stakeholders (see S/2015/891, para. 45). ISIL in Libya was established as a purpose-built affiliate by the ISIL core leadership in the Syrian Arab Republic and Iraq, and has gained control over Libyan territory in a relatively short time (ibid., paras. 20-23). Member States reported that it has also benefited from guidance and support received by emissaries sent from the ISIL core in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic (ibid., para. 21).

18. ISIL in Libya has not been able to build sustained local alliances (ibid., para. 37). Such alliances are difficult to build in an environment where loyalties are fluid and not primarily contingent on ideology. The events in Derna in May and June 2015, when ISIL in Libya was pushed out of the city by its former ally, the Derna Mujahedeen Shura Council, exemplify this (ibid., para. 29).

19. According to Member States, ISIL in Libya had been able to sustain itself through extortion and "taxation", as well as through its connections with criminal groups and smugglers. For example, ISIL in Libya had been imposing "taxes" on the population in Sirte and had set up checkpoints in the town. With the loss of territory under its control, ISIL in Libya may be required to find new funding mechanisms.

20. The past 12 months have seen intent by ISIL in Libya to intensify its terror campaign, combining suicide attacks, executions and conventional fighting. In 2016, the group also continued to attack oil facilities[8] in an attempt to further destabilize Libya and undermine the reopening of the oil facilities to deny its opponents revenue from the country's most essential commodity (see S/2016/501, para. 30). Member States assess that the recent offensive against ISIL in Sirte has the potential to force the group to abandon its key stronghold and to redeploy and regroup in smaller and geographically dispersed cells throughout Libya and in neighbouring countries.

21. The two branches of Ansar Al-Sharia in Libya[9] have been weakened through defections and the killing of some of their fighters since the establishment of ISIL in Libya (see S/2015/891, para. 18). Nevertheless, Member States reported that Al-Qaida continues to maintain relationships with fighters who have declared allegiance to ISIL, in some cases coordinating operations against what they perceive to be common enemies. Currently, the "rebranded" Ansar Al-Sharia in Libya remains particularly active in the north-eastern part of the country. The group also regularly reports through social media on its activities, especially in Benghazi.[10]

22. Ansar Al-Sharia in Tunisia (QDe.143), another Al-Qaida affiliate operating in Libya, has received support from ISIL in Libya in conducting its operations in Tunisia's border areas with Libya and Algeria.[11] During its inception, Ansar Al-Sharia in Tunisia also benefited from support and tutoring by Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb to reinforce its operational capacities, as well as from the return of veterans from the Levant. Its members also received training in camps administered by Al-Qaida affiliates in Libya.[11]

23. Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb has taken advantage of the persistent instability in Libya since 2011 and has used the country as a sanctuary for some senior regional leaders and fighters of Al-Qaida affiliates. In addition, Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb continues to use Libya as a base for logistical support, in particular to procure arms and ammunition.[12] Al-Qaida members benefit from detailed knowledge of the conditions within Libya gained through transnational links built there since the 1990s in connection with local and regional smuggling networks.[13,11]

24. The increased use of the Internet and social media by Al-Qaida affiliates in the Sahel illustrates a determination to promote their actions and messages more actively and to spread propaganda to the wider region, including Libya. In January 2016, for example, Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb incited fighters to deploy to

[8] For example, the attack on Ras Lanouf terminal on 21 January 2016.

[9] Ansar Al Charia Derna (QDe.145) and Ansar Al Charia Benghazi (QDe.146). One Member State highlighted that the two branches are no longer distinguishing themselves as different groups following the large-scale departure of elements of the latter to ISIL in 2015. Some of their members are reported to be relocated.

[10] See, for example, a video by Ansar Al-Sharia in Libya distributed on social media on 11 April 2016 that highlighted its operations in Benghazi and called upon Muslims to support and join the fight.

[11] Member State information.

[12] The large-scale criminal economy in Libya, encompassing goods, drugs, migrants and weapons, presents an opportunity for any terrorist group to cooperate with local smuggling networks to raise funds (see S/2015/891, paras. 57-61).

[13] Member State information.

Libya[14] and, in June, to "rally" to fight in Benghazi.[15] This signals a potential change in perception by Al-Qaida, which now appears to be viewing Libya as a battlefield rather than only as a logistics and support area. One Member State emphasized that Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb's priority remains the Sahel region and it would face major hurdles to become a power broker in Libya, while at the same time jeopardizing its logistics bases.

III. Threat from foreign terrorist fighters

A. Libya

25. The threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters in Libya is closely connected with the operations of entities associated with Al-Qaida, in particular Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb and Ansar Al-Sharia in Tunisia, as well as the emergence of ISIL in the country. Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb has regularly been operating in the south-west of the country, periodically infiltrating Libya and using it for rest and recuperation for its fighters, arms procurement and training. The group exploits the current weakness of governance, while its main area of operations currently remains outside the country.

26. Another prominent group of foreign terrorist fighters in Libya are members of Ansar Al-Sharia in Tunisia. The group continues to train fighters in Libya near the Tunisian border. Furthermore, Ansar Al-Sharia in Tunisia has established safe havens on Mount Chaambi, Tunisia, run in collusion with Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb's Okba Ibn Nafaa brigade, dedicated to hosting and training foreign and local terrorist fighters planning to perpetrate attacks in Tunisia and elsewhere. One Member State reported that Ansar Al-Sharia in Tunisia received funding not only from Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, but also from Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (QDe.129), in order to finance operations in the Mount Chaambi region. A part of the funds also financed the recruitment and dispatch of members of Ansar Al-Sharia in Tunisia to conflict zones. Furthermore, contacts have been reported between Ansar Al-Sharia in Tunisia and the ISIL core, as well as with the Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant (QDe.137), through emissaries.

27. The third and largest group of foreign terrorist fighters currently operating inside Libya are individuals linked to ISIL. Foreigners dominate the top leadership structure of the group in Libya. ISIL in Libya was created by a core of Libyan returnees from the Syrian Arab Republic who, when in the Levant, created Al-Battar Brigade in 2012[16] to support ISIL in the Syrian Arab Republic and Iraq. Many of its members returned to Libya in the spring of 2014, where they reorganized in Derna, under the banner of the Islamic Youth Shura Council. In October 2014, the Islamic Youth Shura Council pledged allegiance to ISIL and declared eastern Libya to be a province of the so-called "Islamic State", calling it "wilayat Barqa" (the Cyrenaica province) (see S/2015/891, para. 22).

[14] Audio speech by Abu Ubaydah Yusuf Al-Anabi, head of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb "Council of Dignitaries" (QDi.389), 14 January 2016.

[15] Audio speech by Al-Anabi, 26 June 2016.

[16] See also, for example: Frederic Wehrey and Ala' Alrababhah, "Rising Out of Chaos: The Islamic State in Libya", *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, 5 March 2015.

28. In March 2015, ISIL in its propaganda called upon supporters of the organization to travel to Libya instead of Iraq or the Syrian Arab Republic. Social media accounts reportedly used by ISIL supporters invited affiliates to opt for Libya instead of the Middle East. "Please rectify your intention if you are sitting home waiting to go to Shaam [Syrian Arab Republic]. Libya needs you", read one social media post from June 2015 (ibid., para. 50). A similar message was distributed in April 2016.[17] However, despite the relatively sophisticated propaganda machinery at its disposal, ISIL in Libya is not yet able to recruit internationally on the same scale as ISIL in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic. For example, no European Member State reported their nationals fighting for ISIL in Libya,[18] and only two European Member States have recently reported having prevented the attempted travel to Libya of a small number of their nationals.[19]

29. Member States have stressed that it is difficult to estimate the number of ISIL elements in Libya with certainty. Member States have reported that between 2,000 and 5,000 ISIL fighters from Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, Mali, Morocco and Mauritania have been deployed in Sirte, Tripoli and Derna (ibid., paras. 20 and 52). One Member State recently reported that there were probably between 5,000 and 7,000 ISIL operatives across Libya, including 3,000 to 4,000 in Sirte. However, as a result of the recent offensive, the current number of those in Sirte is now likely to be well under 1,000, with large numbers of those who have recently fled the city likely to have relocated to other areas in Libya, but potentially also to other countries in the region. As far as demographics are concerned, North African males currently comprise the largest group of foreign terrorist fighters in Libya (ibid., para. 51). One Member State reported a decrease in the flow of individuals coming from Somalia to Libya.

30. Libya also continues to be an attractive destination for foreign terrorist fighters from African countries. In addition to those of North and West African descent, foreign terrorist fighters from East African countries continue to join ISIL in Libya. Some of them enter Libya across its southern border. Member States reported that fighters aiming to join ISIL, transit the country's south-eastern border, where ISIL has established a small operational presence in the region of Al Kufra. According to several Member States, this ISIL presence cooperates on a tactical level with human traffickers in order to channel foreign terrorist fighters towards ISIL cells in other parts of the country. Two Member States reported such fighters having previously entered Libya by the maritime route to join ISIL. According to both Member States, however, the flow recently stopped with the beginning of the current military campaign against ISIL in Sirte.

31. A regional Member State outlined that some foreign terrorist fighters had entered Libya using their passports through official border crossings. Land routes are the most frequently used access routes for such fighters into the country, while some of them have gained entry via Libyan airports. One Member State recently reported that some foreign terrorist fighters had also entered Libya by sea. Since some of them have used passports not previously connected to terrorist activities, monitoring the flow of these individuals into the country is very difficult. In contrast to ISIL in

[17] An ISIL-affiliated Twitter account distributed the call on 9 April 2016.

[18] Foreign terrorist fighters from the region continue to travel to Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic, although currently in smaller numbers than in 2014 and 2015 (see S/2016/501, para. 18).

[19] There are indications that a handful of European foreign terrorist fighters may be present in Libya.

the Levant, no cases of families or women travelling as foreign terrorist fighters or travelling to join fighters in the country have been reported by Member States.

32. Consequently, ISIL fighters in Libya are comprised of three main groups: (a) the hard core of Libyan fighters who have returned from Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic; (b) foreign terrorist fighters (with a sizable contingent comprising fighters from the Maghreb); and (c) a significant number of defectors from local Libyan groups. Although a substantial number of Libyan nationals are among ISIL fighters, they are mainly "returnees" who have fought with ISIL in the Syrian Arab Republic and Iraq in the past few years.[20] One Member State assessed that with the decline in the territory under its control, ISIL is currently facing a test of its internal cohesion. Its constituent parts threaten to again become separate or rejoin previous organizations.

B. Threat of foreign terrorist fighters to the region

33. The threat of foreign terrorist fighters to the region is diverse, emanating from the presence of ISIL in Libya as well as being a result of Al-Qaida affiliates taking advantage of the weakened governance structures in the country. Al-Qaida affiliates use the southern Libyan desert as a staging platform for attacks in the Sahel (see S/2015/891, para. 53). In addition, the military interventions in the Sahel have resulted in temporary and tactical retreats of Al-Qaida affiliated fighters to Libya.

34. ISIL in Libya acts as a support hub for ISIL in North Africa. Member States have reported that funds have been channelled from Libya to Ansar Bait al-Maqdis in the north-eastern part of Sinai, Egypt. One Member State reported substantial and increasing monthly subsidies from ISIL in Libya to Ansar Bait al-Maqdis, starting in 2015. Member State information further suggests that the ISIL presence in Africa was reinforced through the proclamation of allegiance by Ansar Bait al-Maqdis, which resulted in it receiving financial and logistical support. Member States also reported that Ansar Bait al-Maqdis was reinforced by Egyptians who had trained in Libya. The United Nations is not in a position to verify the information provided by Member States.

35. The recent pressure against ISIL in Libya could lead its members, including foreign terrorist fighters, to relocate and regroup in smaller and geographically dispersed cells across Libya and in neighbouring countries. A Member State outlined that Tunisian foreign terrorist fighters in particular could move in more significant numbers back to Tunisia, thus exacerbating an already significant threat there. According to a Member State, dozens of Tunisian fighters have already returned, with the intent to conduct attacks. In addition, the border region between the two countries continues to be the theatre of clashes between Tunisian ISIL affiliates and security forces.

36. In Tunisia, a local "start-up" group has pledged allegiance to ISIL, calling itself Jund Al-Khilafah[21] in Tunisia (soldiers of the caliphate), and claimed a series of deadly attacks in 2015, including the attack against the National Bardo Museum

[20] In total, around 3,500 Libyan nationals had left the country to join groups in the Syrian Arab Republic and Iraq, 800 of whom came back to join the newly formed ISIL affiliate. They returned in several waves between 2014 and 2015 (Member State information).

[21] Not to be confused with the similarly named group in Algeria, Jund al-Khilafah in Algeria (QDe.151).

in March 2015. Several Member States reported that the perpetrators of the attack had previously trained in Libya. According to Member State reports, the group comprises around 50 members and is based in Jebel Selloum. One commander of Jund Al-Khilafah in Tunisia, Saif Eddin Jammali, also known as Abu Qaqaa, was killed during clashes with Tunisian security forces in May 2016.[22] The ISIL core has not publicly accepted this group as an affiliate.

37. Attacks perpetrated in Tunisia in 2015 and 2016 have either involved Tunisian returnees from Libya or have been coordinated by Tunisian foreign terrorist fighters from Libyan territory, along with financial and logistical support. A recent example was the clashes in Ben Guerdane in March 2016,[23] which saw the involvement of Tunisian fighters who had infiltrated from Libya. According to a Member State, among several hundred Tunisians being trained in Libyan camps, some are awaiting favourable conditions to infiltrate Tunisia for further attacks. Many Tunisian fighters associated with high profile attacks in Tunisia were killed in an air strike on 19 February 2016 in Sabratha, Libya (see S/2016/501, para. 29). Tunisian returnees have also been instrumental in the recruitment and indoctrination of new fighters and their dispatch to conflict zones.

38. The flows of arms and fighters from Libya were instrumental in allowing Al-Qaida affiliates to control a significant amount of territory in Mali (see S/2013/467, para. 7). This was a major evolution in terms of the terrorist threat in the region, and seen from this perspective its direct and indirect enduring effects are still noticeable in the Sahel-Sahara region. Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb and its affiliates, including foreign terrorist fighters, were dislodged from the main cities in Mali and dispersed throughout the region. However, they have continued to plan and mount attacks in the Sahel and West Africa, including recent attacks that targeted Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire for the first time.[24]

39. One Member State reported that some foreign terrorist fighters from Algeria travelling to join ISIL in the Syrian Arab Republic in the past few years had used Libya as a transit country. In addition, another Member State highlighted that a few Algerian foreign terrorist fighters had joined ISIL in Libya. The main destination for Algerian fighters, however, has traditionally been Al-Qaida affiliated groups in the Sahel and the Sahara, where Algerian nationals maintain leadership positions.[25] Lastly, Libyan foreign terrorist fighters fighting for Al-Qaida affiliated groups were involved in attacks in Algeria in the past.[26]

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[22] See, for example, Reuters, "Tunisian forces say kill local Islamic State commander in clashes", 19 May 2016. Available from http://af.reuters.com/article/commoditiesNews/idAFL5N18G2SA.

[23] See, for example, Callum Paton, "Tunisia: Isis seeking to create emirate in Ben Guerdane after 53 killed in raid from Libya", *International Business Times*, 8 March 2016.

[24] In January 2016, Al Mourabitoun (QDe.141) perpetrated simultaneous attacks against a hotel, a coffee shop and a restaurant in Ouagadougou, and in March 2016 attacked three hotels in Grand Bassam, Côte d'Ivoire.

[25] For example: Belmokhtar (QDi.136), the leader of Al Mourabitoun (QDe.141), Al-Anabi (QDi.389, see footnotes above), head of the "Council of Dignitaries", Ahmed Deghdegh (QDi.252), the finance chief of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, and Djamel Akkacha (QDi.313), a coordinator for groups associated with Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb.

[26] For example, during the attack against the gas installation in In Amenas, Algeria, in January 2013, perpetrated by a group of Al-Qaida affiliated fighters, led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar, Libyan foreign terrorist fighters took part (see S/2014/770, para. 36) and a significant part of the participating fighters were trained in Libya (see S/2015/891, para. 17).

40. In the Niger, the impact of the situation in Libya has been less acute in recent months, while Jama'atu Ahlis-sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad (Boko Haram) (QDe.138) incursions have become a more serious threat. The last high profile attack in the Niger linked to Libya dates to May 2013. At that time, members of Al Mouakaoune Biddam (QDe.139) and the Mouvement pour l'Unification et le Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest (QDe.134) infiltrated into the Niger from Libya and perpetrated two coordinated attacks against a commercial mining site in Arlit and an army base in Agadez before retreating to Libya.[27] Chad faces a more serious threat from Boko Haram incursions than from foreign terrorist fighters coming from Libya. Nevertheless, the situation in Libya is viewed by regional Member States as a source of concern, in particular with regard to the proximity of mobile training camps in southern Libya along with the risk of arms smuggling and infiltration of fighters.

41. Due to Al-Shabaab's[28] resistance to embracing the ISIL agenda, the East African region has not experienced any attacks linked to ISIL in Libya. Nonetheless, ISIL views the region as a vital area with significant potential for expansion. Two Member States have reported enhanced radicalization and recruitment mainly through social media, resulting in the flow of foreign terrorist fighters travelling to join ISIL in Libya from East Africa. According to Member State assessments, ISIL foreign terrorist fighters from the region self-fund their activities and travels. Member States also indicate that ISIL has urged local recruits and sympathizers to conduct terrorist attacks in countries or the region. Additionally, a number of foreign terrorist fighters from the region are fighting within the ranks of ISIL in Libya.[29]

IV. Existing countermeasures implemented by Libya and neighbouring States

A. Libya

42. The deteriorating security situation in Libya since the beginning of the armed conflict in 2011 has severely limited engagement between the Counter-Terrorism Committee and the Libyan authorities. The Committee has thus been unable to update its 2009 assessment of Libya's capacity to effectively implement Security Council resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005) or to consider Libya's implementation of Council resolution 2178 (2014). However, the Committee believes that Libya's capacity to combat terrorism and address the flow of foreign terrorist fighters in the region has been significantly undermined.

Criminal justice and legislation

43. Libya appears to rely on its Criminal Code to prosecute terrorist offences, which are handled by specialized public prosecution authorities and criminal courts responsible for State security. The Code has not been reviewed to incorporate the foreign terrorist fighter-related offences provided for in resolution 2178 (2014).

[27] S/2014/41, para. 6.

[28] Listed under permanent reference number SOe.001 by the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea.

[29] For example, in a communiqué distributed via social media in the first week of June 2016, ISIL in Libya highlighted a suicide attack by one of its Kenyan fighters near Sirte.

44. Because of the worsening security environment, the administration of justice has been brought to a state of near collapse in many parts of the country. According to the report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights of 15 February 2016 (A/HRC/31/47), prosecutors and judges endured death threats, court bombings, assaults and abductions throughout 2014 and 2015. As a consequence, courts in Derna, Benghazi and Sirte closed their doors in 2014. Some Benghazi courts partially resumed their activities in 2015. Courts in Tripoli temporarily suspended activities during the fighting in mid-2014. The report further noted that, since the armed conflict in 2011, more than 5,000 individuals were still detained without having had their cases properly examined to determine whether they could be charged or released. According to the United Nations Support Mission in Libya, around 800 individuals (200 of whom are believed to be affiliated with ISIL) have been detained in the Mitiga prison. Law enforcement and judicial authorities are unable to gain access to these individuals because they are detained by local militias. Owing to the near collapse of the criminal justice system there have been very few investigations and prosecutions. This means not only that there are significant challenges to ensuring accountability, but also that victims have little recourse to protection or to effective remedy. There have been no known prosecutions of individuals suspected of being terrorists or foreign terrorist fighters. The judicial police currently face significant challenges in their efforts to control the facilities for which they are responsible.

Counter-financing of terrorism

45. Libya's anti-money-laundering and counter-financing of terrorism legal framework consists of Anti-Money-Laundering Law No. 2 of 2005, supplemented by Implementing Regulation No. 300 of 2007. The Law, however, does not contain measures to combat the financing of terrorism or the financing of foreign terrorist fighter travel. Moreover, Libya has not established a mechanism for the freezing of terrorist assets, and it is unclear whether its financial intelligence unit is fully operational.

Border control

46. Libya's 4,000-km land borders and 2,000-km coastal border, characterized variously by a desert and mountain landscape, present significant challenges for the border control authorities. Libya has employed a number of innovative approaches in an effort to strengthen its border management, including the establishment of multi-agency security units at the borders to coordinate patrols and share information, and counter-terrorism border units with specific mandates. Monitoring and control of major border crossings, particularly in desert regions, was formerly the responsibility of the military, which used checkpoints and air and maritime patrols, working in coordination with police and customs units. Libya also cooperated with Tunisia on a pilot project to provide joint customs controls at the Ras Jdeer border crossing, which was managed by a unified command of all relevant agencies. This approach proved successful. The Libyan aviation authorities also formerly received advance passenger manifests, which were checked against various databases. Since 2011, however, most of these arrangements and structures have ceased. Armed groups continue to retain command structures and exercise autonomous control over many such facilities (see A/HRC/31/47). Moreover, militia groups are performing border-control functions. A recent decree provided for the

establishment of a presidential guard in charge of police, immigration and border control, but it is not yet fully operational.

47. In September 2013, Tripoli International Airport was connected to the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) Stolen and Lost Travel Documents database within the framework of "Project RELINC (Rebuilding Libya's Investigative Capability)",[30] enabling border control authorities to systematically check incoming travellers and their passports against INTERPOL databases for the first time. Owing to the country's deteriorating security situation, it was not possible to fully connect Benghazi Airport to INTERPOL databases or to screen travellers arriving at Tripoli International Airport against INTERPOL databases.

Maritime measures

48. Operation "Sophia", part of the European Union military operation in the southern central Mediterranean, was charged with two additional supporting tasks in June 2016: training the Libyan coast guard and navy and contributing to the implementation of the United Nations arms embargo on the high seas off the coast of Libya. The operation's task has been to undertake systematic efforts to identify, capture and dispose of vessels and enabling assets used, or suspected of being used, by migrant smugglers or traffickers. Boarding, search, seizure and diversion of smugglers' vessels or items prohibited under the arms embargo have not been extended into Libyan territorial waters and are limited to smuggling activities. However, operation "Sophia" may serve to deter foreign terrorist fighters seeking to travel to or from Libya by sea.

B. Neighbouring States

49. The foreign terrorist fighter phenomenon is relatively new to most States neighbouring Libya, with the exception of Algeria and Egypt. The lessons learned in Algeria and Egypt following the return of Algerian and Egyptian fighters who took part in the war in Afghanistan in the 1980s and 1990s could be instructive to States neighbouring Libya currently facing similar challenges in dealing with foreign terrorist fighters. Those challenges include the criminalization and prosecution of offences, the rehabilitation and reintegration of returnees and defectors and the prevention of recruitment and travel.

Criminalization, prosecution, and the rehabilitation and reintegration of returnees

50. States neighbouring Libya are continuing to take steps to update their national legislation, in accordance with resolution 2178 (2014), to facilitate the prosecution, as serious criminal offences, of the travel of foreign terrorist fighters for terrorism or related training, as well as the financing or facilitation of their travel. Investigative and prosecutorial capacity varies from State to State. It is not known whether any foreign terrorist fighter has been prosecuted, but some have been arrested on their return. In the absence of effective prosecution, rehabilitation and reintegration strategies, neighbouring States will face significant challenges in addressing returnees. Those challenges may be exacerbated by difficulties in

[30] Project RELINC (Rebuilding Libya's Investigative Capability) was an 18-month project launched in 2012 with European Union support and implemented by INTERPOL.

collecting the evidence required to mount effective prosecutions. Moreover, since many returnees are minors or women, there is a need to develop differentiated and tailored approaches.

Countering recruitment and preventing the travel of foreign terrorist fighters

51. Preventing foreign terrorist fighter recruitment and disrupting recruitment networks requires community policing, intelligence gathering and the monitoring of websites and social media. Libya's neighbouring States, while recognizing the need to develop comprehensive approaches to countering recruitment and preventing and countering violent extremism, do not appear to have adequate capacity to fully implement such measures; however, some have established partnerships with religious and cultural institutions to raise awareness and mitigate the impact of recruitment and violent extremism.

52. Preventing the travel of foreign terrorist fighters requires effective border controls. The Member States neighbouring Libya to the north have recently strengthened their surveillance at border posts and in desert areas. For example, Tunisia has completed a 200-km (125 mile) barrier along its border with Libya and is currently installing electronic monitoring systems to prevent infiltration by such fighters. Algeria has connected all of its border posts to the INTERPOL I-24/7 databases and has transmitted the INTERPOL foreign terrorist fighters "photo album" to all of its official border checkpoints. Other control measures include the development and use of risk criteria to screen potential foreign terrorist fighters leaving or entering the country. Egyptian military forces actively monitor the Egyptian desert borders in order to prevent the illegal movement of persons and goods. The Egyptian navy is also active in protecting maritime borders by exercising controls on illegal migration towards Europe.

53. The recent arrest of suspected foreign terrorist fighters to the south-east indicates that the fighters are crossing into Libya from the Sudan and vice versa. In November 2013, the Sudan and Libya deployed joint forces to protect their common border, prevent infiltrations and combat terrorism. In 2015, however, Libya withdrew its troops. It is unclear whether Sudanese troops are still deployed.

54. To the south-west, lengthy and porous borders, the limited number of border posts and the lack of capacity and resources to control borders represent major challenges for the Niger and Chad in terms of preventing the flow of foreign terrorist fighters. The Niger has established patrols on the Libyan border. Northern Chad (bordering Libya and the Niger) has been declared a military area subject to special arrangements for access and residence. The border with Libya (Tibesti area) has been a mined area for 30 years, but some border crossings have been set up to facilitate inter-State movement.

55. In the absence of a government presence, neighbouring Member States are also engaging with border communities in order to identify and prevent illegal crossings into their territories. Joint Sudanese-Chadian forces were set up in 2010 and are commanded alternately by a General from one of the two Member States. These forces rely on command posts spread over 2,000 km of border and a total of 3,000 personnel (from both Member States). An aerial surveillance mechanism has been set up in partnership with the French-led military Operation Barkhane. This should assist countries such as Chad and the Niger in their efforts to prevent infiltration by terrorists and foreign terrorist fighters.

V. United Nations capacity-building efforts to counter the threat of foreign terrorist fighters in Libya and neighbouring States

56. Following the recommendation of the Security Council in its presidential statement of 29 May 2015 (S/PRST/2015/11), the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force Office developed the United Nations capacity-building implementation plan for countering the flow of foreign terrorist fighters. Taking an "All United Nations" approach, the Office worked through its inter-agency foreign terrorist fighter working group and developed a comprehensive and coherent plan that includes 37 mutually reinforcing project proposals submitted by 12 Task Force member entities (United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre, Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, United Nations Alliance of Civilizations, United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women, Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, International Civil Aviation Organization, International Organization for Migration and INTERPOL). The plan will help to build the capacity of the most affected Member States to prevent and counter this threat. The projects cover a wide variety of themes to impact the flow of foreign terrorist fighters across the entire foreign terrorist fighter "life cycle", including their radicalization, training, travel to conflict zones, financing, fighting, potential return and reactivation, as well as reintegration and rehabilitation should they return. Based on their assessments and expert knowledge, the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate lent its support to develop the capacity-building building implementation plan by rating the criticality of the projects according to key thematic needs in the most affected Member States and regions. The individual project proposals have different timescales and budgets. The sum total of their budgets is $124 million over three to five years.

57. Under the umbrella of the capacity-building implementation plan, the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre is already implementing its project on advance passenger information. The project will help Member States in the Middle East and North Africa region and beyond and build the capacities of Member States to prevent individuals believed to be foreign terrorist fighters from leaving, entering or transiting through their territories, raise awareness of the benefits of using advance passenger information and passenger name records as a border management tool to stem the flow of foreign terrorist fighters and determine the technical assistance needs of participants in implementing such systems.

58. The United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre, together with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, will also implement a project to prevent violent extremism and promote youth empowerment in the North Africa and Middle East region, and will support Member States, with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, in their efforts to prevent radicalization to violence in prisons.

59. Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force member entities, such as the International Organization for Migration, INTERPOL and the International Civil Aviation Organization, have submitted important project proposals under the

implementation plan to help the authorities of Libya and neighbouring Member States to enhance their border security capacities to prevent the travel of foreign terrorist fighters to conflict zones.

60. The United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre is also implementing the border security initiative in the wider Sahel and the East Africa/Horn of Africa region with the Global Counterterrorism Forum and the Governments of the United States of America and Morocco. The objective of the project is to provide know-how on modern standards to border law enforcement services to enhance relevant capacities in the areas of cross-border cooperation and green and blue border surveillance.

61. In its presidential statement, the Security Council encouraged Member States to provide needed financial and other assistance to the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force and the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre. To date, approximately 13 per cent of the implementation plan is funded. To implement all 37 projects, additional resources will be required.

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Seventy-first year

Letter dated 19 July 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I enclose herewith two separate annexes, recording the infringements of international air traffic regulations and violations of the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey (see annex I) and the illegal use of closed ports by Turkish warships during the month of June 2016 (see annex II). It should also be noted that Turkish commercial aircraft systematically use the illegal airport of Tympou.

Furthermore, I wish to inform you that Turkey and the occupation regime illegally issued notices to airmen on 21 and 28 June, relating to exercises organized by the Turkish Air Force.

The actions of Turkey are clearly aimed at undermining the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus, bolstering the continuing de facto division and upgrading the secessionist entity's status, by claiming a purported airspace over the occupied territory of the Republic. Additionally, Turkey continues to systematically harass civilian and military aircraft within the Nicosia flight information region (FIR) via radio calls. Meanwhile, Nicosia FIR infringements and violations of the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus continue unabated. Turkey's policy of persistently breaching international law and defying international rules and regulations puts the safety of international civil aviation at risk, has a negative impact on the stability of the region and causes difficulties for air traffic over Cyprus.

It should further be underlined that the continuation of Turkey's illegal actions creates tension during a critical period for the successful outcome of the ongoing negotiation process for a peaceful comprehensive solution of the Cyprus problem.

On behalf of my Government, I strongly protest the continuing infringements of international air traffic regulations and the violations of the national airspace and the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey and appeal for their immediate cessation. The Republic of Cyprus reiterates, in this respect, its call for adherence to the principle of sovereignty and non-interference enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.

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Please recycle

I would be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annexes circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 44, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Nicholas **Emiliou**

Annex I to the letter dated 19 July 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Airborne violations

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
1 June	1010-1227	One A-319 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia flight information region (FIR) and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia air control centre (ACC).
	1044-1200	Twenty-three F-16 and other unidentified Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1539-1652	Twenty-three F-16 and other unidentified Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1551-1704	Two Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1957-2001	One A-319 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
2 June	0120-0154	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1620-1750	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
3 June	1020-1140	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting Nicosia ACC.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	2058-2126	One A-400 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
4 June	0201-0237	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
5 June	1218-1240	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1547-1700	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
6 June	0952-1023	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1004-1230	Three AB-412 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1135-1158	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1138-1200	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1139-1230	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1340-1401	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1353-1408	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
7 June	0640-0707	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	0829-0901	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1758-1940	Two Turkish military helicopters infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
8 June	1140-1340	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1147-1341	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1150-1823	One AB-412 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1240-1759	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1242-1410	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1243-1803	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1253-1438	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1317-1824	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1632-1759	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1637-1804	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1635-1750	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1637-1826	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
9 June	1140-1221	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1249-1308	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1251-1313	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1317-1428	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1326-1500	One AB-412 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1412-1428	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1445-1516	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.

Date	Time	Nature of violation
	1516-1535	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1747-1804	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
10 June	0935-1424	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1543-1606	One GLF-5 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	2357-0006	One GLF-5 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
12 June	0614-0645	One PA-46 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1106-1125	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1215-1232	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1849-1914	One PA-46 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
13 June	0955-1128	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
14 June	1014-1055	One UH-1 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
17 June	1000-1158	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
22 June	0617-0736	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
23 June	1139-1159	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1722-1743	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
24 June	0840-1010	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
28 June	1213-1244	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1354-1507	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1358-1503	Two F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1404-1501	Four F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1538-1606	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
30 June	0634-0734	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	0845-1102	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1420-1518	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.

Annex II to the letter dated 19 July 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Naval violations

Dates	*Nature of violation*
6-7 June	One SG-103 Turkish offshore patrol vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces.
6-8 June	One F-492 Turkish frigate violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces.
6-8 June	One SG-704 Turkish open sea vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces.
6-8 June	One SG-703 Turkish open sea vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces.
6-8 June	One SG-20 Turkish offshore patrol vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces.
6-8 June	One SG-104 Turkish offshore patrol vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces.
7-10 June	One SG-104 Turkish offshore patrol vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces.
8 June	One SG-89 Turkish offshore patrol vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces.
8-9 June	One SG-20 Turkish offshore patrol vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces.
8-9 June	One SG-89 Turkish offshore patrol vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces.
8-9 June	One F-492 Turkish frigate violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces.

Dates	*Nature of violation*
8-10 June	One SG-704 Turkish open sea vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces.
8-10 June	One SG-703 Turkish open sea vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces.
8-10 June	One SG-104 Turkish offshore patrol vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces.